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Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind (1996), it has been
customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the
so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and
the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of
intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking
the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the na-
ture of subjectivity and experience if we ignore intentionality, or do we not run the risk of
thereby reinstating a Cartesian subject-world dualism that ignores everything captured by the
phrase »being-in-the-world«? In my article, I will inquire whether phenomenal consciousness
and intentionality are two sides of the same coin that cannot be separated without committing
a fallacy of division.
In his book The Conscious Mind David Chalmers introduced a by now fa-
miliar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of con-
sciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of
how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and
exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection
(Chalmers, 1996, 4; 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but
they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can
all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and
explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might
still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem – also
known as the problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995, 201) – is the pro-
blem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential
qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee’, to ‘touch an ice cube’, to
‘look at a sunset’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it at all
feel like anything?
Chalmers’s distinction confronts us with a version of the so-called ‘explana-
tory gap’. On the one hand, we have certain cognitive functions, which can
apparently be explained reductively, and on the other hand, we have a
number of experiential qualities, which seem to resist this reductive expla-
nation. We can establish that a certain function is accompanied by a certain
experience, but we have no idea why that happens, and regardless of how
closely we scrutinize the neural mechanisms we don’t seem to be getting
any closer at an answer.
In his book, Chalmers also distinguished two concepts of mind: a phenome-
nal concept and a psychological concept. The first captures the conscious
aspect of mind: Mind is understood in terms of conscious experience. The
second concept understands mind in functional terms as the causal or ex-
planatory basis for behavior. According to the phenomenal concept, a state
is mental if it ‘feels’ a certain way; according to the psychological concept,
a state is mental if it plays an appropriate causal role. The first concept
characterizes mind by the way it feels, the second by what it does (Chal-
mers, 1996, 11–12), and according to Chalmers it is the first concept that is
troublesome and which resists standard attempts at explanation.1
In a later article from 1997, Chalmers seems to have modified, or at least
clarified, his position slightly. He now concedes that such notions as atten-
tion, memory, intentionality etc. contain both easy and hard aspects (Chal-
mers, 1997, 10). A full and comprehensive understanding of e.g. intention-
ality would consequently entail solving the hard problem, or to put it diffe-
rently, an analysis of thoughts, beliefs, categorization etc. that ignored the
experiential side would merely be an analysis of what could be called
pseudo-thoughts or pseudo-beliefs (Chalmers, 1997, 20). This clarification
fits well with an observation that Chalmers made already in The Conscious
Mind, namely, that one could operate with a deflationary and an inflationary
concept of belief, respectively. Whereas the first concept is a purely psy-
chological (functional) concept that does not involve any reference to con-
scious experience, the second concept entails that conscious experience is
required for true intentionality (Chalmers, 1996, 20). In 1997, Chalmers
admits that he is torn on the issue, and that he over time has become in-
creasingly sympathetic to the second concept, and to the idea that con-
sciousness is the primary source of meaning, so that intentional content
may in fact be grounded in phenomenal content, but he thinks the matter
needs further examination (Chalmers, 1997, 21).
I welcome this clarification, but I also find it slightly surprising that Chal-
mers is prepared to concede this much. As far as I can see, the very distinc-
tion between the easy problems and the hard problem of consciousness be-
comes questionable the moment one opts for the inflationary concept.
Given this concept, it seems natural to conclude that there are in fact no
easy problems of consciousness. The truly easy problems are all problems
about pseudo-thoughts etc., that is, about non-conscious information pro-
cessing, but a treatment of these issues should not be confused with an ex-
planation of the kind of conscious intentionality that we encounter in hu-
man beings. In other words, we will not understand how human beings
consciously intend, discriminate, categorize, react, report, and introspect
etc. until we understand the role of subjective experience in those pro-
cesses (cf. Hodgson, 1996).
Chalmers’s discussion of the hard problem has identified and labeled an
aspect of consciousness that cannot be ignored. However, his way of defining
and distinguishing the hard problem from the easy problems seems in
many ways indebted to the very reductionism that he is out to oppose. If
one thinks that cognition and intentionality is basically a matter of infor-
mation processing and causal co-variation that could in principle just as
well go on in a mindless computer – or to use Chalmers’ own favored ex-
ample, in an experienceless zombie – then one is left with the impression
that all that is really distinctive about consciousness is its qualitative or
phenomenal aspect. But this seems to suggest that with the exception of
some evanescent qualia everything about consciousness including inten-
tionality can be explained in reductive (computational or neural) terms;
and in this case, epiphenomenalism threatens.
To put it differently, Chalmers’s distinction between the hard and the easy
problems of consciousness shares a common feature with many other re-
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cent analytical attempts to defend consciousness against the onslaught of
reductionism: They all grant far too much to the other side. Reductionism
has typically proceeded with a classical divide and rule strategy. There are
basically two sides to consciousness: Intentionality and phenomenality. We
don’t currently know how to reduce the latter aspect, so let us separate the
two sides, and concentrate on the first. If we then succeed in explaining in-
tentionality reductively, the aspect of phenomenality cannot be all that sig-
nificant. Many non-reductive materialists have uncritically adopted the
very same strategy. They have marginalized subjectivity by identifying it
with epiphenomenal qualia and have then claimed that it is this aspect
which eludes reductionism.
But is this partition really acceptable, are we really dealing with two sepa-
rate problems, or is experience and intentionality on the contrary inti-
mately connected? Is it really possible to investigate intentionality properly
without taking experience, the first-person perspective, semantics, etc., into
account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of subjec-
tivity and experience if we ignore intentionality. Or do we not then run the
risk of reinstating a Cartesian subject-world dualism that ignores every-
thing captured by the phrase »being-in-the-world«?
In the following, I wish to consider some arguments in favor of opposing
the separation. I will try to supply some answers to the three following
questions:
1. What forms of intentionality possess phenomenal features?
2. Do all experiences possess intentional features?
3. If the intentional and the phenomenal go hand in hand, is the connec-
tion then contingent or essential?
All of the three questions call for quite substantial analyses. All I can do in
the following is to provide some preliminary reflections; reflections that
will incidentally suggest that analytical philosophy in its dealing with these
questions might profit from looking at some of the resources found in con-
tinental phenomenology. Why? Because many of the problems and ques-
tions that analytical philosophy of mind are currently facing are problems
and questions that phenomenologists have been struggling with for more
than a century. Drawing on their results would not only help avoiding un-
necessary repetitions, it might also bring the contemporary debate to a
higher level of sophistication.
1. Is there a ‘what it is like’
to intentional consciousness?
It is relatively uncontroversial that there is a certain (phenomenal) quality
of ‘what it is like’ or what it ‘feels’ like to have perceptual experiences, de-
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Chalmers insists that the phenomenology and
the psychology of mind are systematically re-
lated. The phenomenal structure is mirrored
by the psychological structure and vice versa.
Whenever there is conscious experience, the-
re is also some corresponding information
processing going on, and whenever there is
information available in the cognitive system
for control of behavior, there will also be a
corresponding conscious experience. Consci-
ousness and cognition consequently coheres
in a systematic and intimate way, and Chal-
mers speaks of an isomorphic relation, which
he calls the principle of structural coherence
(Chalmers, 1995, 212–213; 1996, 218–225).
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sires, feelings, and moods. There is something it is like to taste an ome-
lette, to touch an ice cube, to crave chocolate, to have stage fright, to feel
envious, nervous, depressed, or happy. However, is it really acceptable to
limit the phenomenal dimension of experience to sensory or emotional sta-
tes alone? Is there nothing it is like simply to think of (rather than per-
ceive) a green apple? And what about abstract beliefs, is there nothing it is
like to believe that the square root of 9 = 3? Many contemporary philoso-
phers have denied that beliefs are inherently phenomenal (cf. Tye, 1995,
138, Jacob, 1998, O’Shaughnessy, 2000, 39, 41). I think they are mistaken.
Back in the Logical Investigations (1900–1901) Husserl argued that conscious
thoughts have experiential qualities, and that episodes of conscious thoughts
are experiential episodes. In arguing for this claim, Husserl drew some dis-
tinctions that I think are of relevance in this context. According to Husserl,
every intentional experience possesses two different, but inseparable mo-
ments. Every intentional experience is an experience of a specific type, be
it an experience of judging, hoping, desiring, regretting, remembering,
affirming, doubting, wondering, fearing, etc. Husserl called this aspect of
the experience, the intentional quality of the experience. Every intentional
experience is also directed at something, is also about something, be it an
experience of a deer, a cat, or a mathematic state of affairs. Husserl called
the component that specifies what the experience is about, the intentional
matter of the experience (Husserl, 1984, 425–426). Needless to say, the
same quality can be combined with different matters, and the same matter
can be combined with different qualities. It is possible to doubt that ‘the in-
flation will continue’, doubt that ‘the election was fair’, or doubt that ‘one’s
next book will be an international bestseller’, just as it is possible to deny
that ‘the lily is white’, to judge that ‘the lily is white’, or to question whether
‘the lily is white’. Husserl’s distinction between the intentional matter and
the intentional quality consequently bears a certain resemblance to the
contemporary distinction between propositional content and propositional
attitudes (though it is important to emphasize that Husserl by no means
took all intentional experiences to be propositional in nature). But, and
this is of course the central point, Husserl considered these cognitive diffe-
rences to be experiential differences. Each of the different intentional quali-
ties has its own phenomenal character. There is an experiential difference
between affirming and denying that Hegel was the greatest of the German
idealists, just as there is an experiential difference between expecting and
doubting that Denmark will win the 2002 FIFA World Cup. What it is like
to be in one type of intentional state differs from what it is like to be in an-
other type of intentional state.2 Similarly, the different intentional matters
each have their own phenomenal character. There is an experiential diffe-
rence between believing that ‘thoughts without content are empty’ and be-
lieving that ‘intuitions without concepts are blind’, just as there is an experi-
ential difference between denying that ‘the Eiffel Tower is higher than the
Empire State building’ and denying that ‘North Korea has a viable eco-
nomy’. To put it differently, a change in the intentional matter will entail a
change in what it is like to undergo the experience in question.3 And these
experiential differences, these differences in what it is like to think differ-
ent thoughts, are not simply sensory differences.4
In the same work, Husserl also called attention to the fact that one and the
same object can be given in a variety of different modes. This is not only
the case for spatiotemporal objects (one and the same tree can be given
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from this or that perspective, as perceived or recollected etc.), but also for
ideal or categorial objects. There is an experiential difference between
thinking of the theorem of Pythagoras in an empty and signitive manner,
i.e., without really understanding it, and doing so in an intuitive and ful-
filled manner, i.e., by actually thinking it through with comprehension
(Husserl, 1984, 73, 667–676). In fact, as Husserl points out, our under-




Using a decidedly Husserlian jargon, Siewert
has recently spoken of noetic phenomenal fe-
atures (Siewert, 1998, 284). Sticking to the
distinction between propositional content and
attitude, one could argue that there is what
one could call a qualitative feel to the diffe-
rent propositional attitudes.
3
However, this does not entail that two expe-
riences that differ in their ‘what it is like’
cannot intend the same object, nor does it
entail that two experiences that are alike in
their ‘what it is like’ must necessarily intend
the same object.
4
When we think a certain thought, for instan-
ce the thought ‘Paris is the capital of Fran-
ce’, the thinking will often be accompanied
by a non-vocalized utterance, an aural im-
agery or auralization, of the very string of
words used to express the thought. When we
think the thought, we frequently ‘hear’ the
sentence for our inner ear. At the same time,
the thought will also frequently evoke cer-
tain ‘mental images’, say, visualizations of the
Eiffel Tower, of baguettes, etc. It could be
argued that abstract thoughts are accompa-
nied by mental imagery and that the phe-
nomenal qualities to be encountered in ab-
stract thought are in fact constituted by this
imagery. However, as Husserl already made
clear in Logical Investigation, this attempt to
deny that thinking has any distinct phenome-
nality to it, is problematic. As Husserl points
out, there is a marked difference between
what it is like to auralize a certain string of
meaningless noise, and what it is like to au-
ralize the very same string, but this time un-
derstanding and meaning something by it
(Husserl, 1984, 46–47, 398). Since the phe-
nomenality of the auralization is the same in
both cases, the phenomenal difference must
be located elsewhere, namely in the thinking
itself. The case of homonyms and synonyms
also clearly demonstrate that the phenome-
nality of thinking and the phenomenality of
aural imagery can vary independently of each
other. As for the attempt to identify the phe-
nomenal quality of thought with the pheno-
menal quality of visualization a similar argu-
ment can be employed. Two different thoughts,
say, ‘Paris is the capital of France’, and ‘Pari-
sians regularly consume baguettes’ might be
accompanied by the same visualization of
baguettes, but what it is like to think the two
thoughts remain very different. Having de-
monstrated this much, Husserl then proceeds
to criticize the view according to which the
imagery actually constitutes the very mean-
ing of the thought: To understand what is
being thought is to have the appropriate
‘mental image’ before one’s inner eye (Husserl,
1984, 67–72). The arguments he employs bear
a striking resemblance to some of the ideas
that were subsequently used by Wittgenstein
in Philosophical Investigations: 1. From time
to time, the thoughts we are thinking, for in-
stance thoughts like ‘every algebraic equa-
tion of uneven grade has at least one real
root’ will in fact not be accompanied by any
imagery whatsoever. If the meaning were ac-
tually located in the ‘mental images,’ the
thoughts in question would be meaningless,
but this is not the case. 2. Frequently, our
thoughts, for instance the thought that ‘the
horrors of World War I had a decisive im-
pact on post-war painting’ will in fact evoke
certain visualizations, but visualizations of
quite unrelated matters. To suggest that the
meanings of the thoughts are to be located
in such images is of course absurd. 3. Fur-
thermore, the fact that the meaning of a
thought can remain the same although the
accompanying imagery varies also precludes
any straightforward identification. 4. Absurd
thoughts like the thought of a square circle is
not meaningless, but it can never be accom-
panied by a matching image, since a visuali-
zation of a square circle is impossible in prin-
ciple. 5. Finally, referring to Descartes fa-
mous example in the 6th Meditation, Husserl
points out that we can easily distinguish
thoughts like ‘a chiliagon is a many sided po-
lygon’, and ‘a myriagon is a many sided poly-
gon’, although the imagery that accompany
both thoughts might be indistinguishable.
Thus, as Husserl concludes, although imagery
might function as an aid to the understand-
ing, it is not what is understood, it does not
constitute the meaning of the thought (Hus-
serl, 1984, 71). As Siewert later concludes
(having independently covered much of the
same ground as Husserl): Wittgenstein has
»long warned us off the error assimilating
thought and understanding to mental ima-
gery. But we ought not to correct Humean
confusion on this point, only to persist in the
empiricist tradition’s equally noxious error
of supposing thought and understanding to
be experiential, only if imagistic.« (Siewert,
1998, 305–306)
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»Let us imagine that certain arabesques or figures have at first affected us merely aestheti-
cally, and that we then suddenly realize that we are dealing with symbols or verbal signs. In
what does this difference consist? Or let us take the case of a man attentively hearing some
totally strange word as a sound-complex without even dreaming it is a word, and compare this
with the case of the same man afterwards hearing the word, in the course of conversation, and
now acquainted with its meaning, but not illustrating it intuitively. What in general is the sur-
plus element distinguishing the understanding of a symbolically functioning expression from
the uncomprehended verbal sound? What is the difference between simply looking at a con-
crete object A, and treating it as a representative of ‘any A whatsoever’? In this and countless
similar cases it is the act-characters that differ.« (Husserl, 1984, 398)
More recently, Galen Strawson has argued in a similar fashion, and in his
book Mental Reality he provides the following neat example. Strawson asks
us to consider a situation where Jacques (a monoglot Frenchman) and Jack
(a monoglot Englishman) are both listening to the same news in French.
Jacques and Jack are certainly not experiencing the same, for only Jacques
is able to understand what is being said; only Jacques is in possession of
what might be called an experience of understanding. To put it differently,
there is normally something it is like, experientially, to understand a sen-
tence. There is an experiential difference between hearing something that
one does not understand, and hearing and understanding the very same
sentence. And this experiential difference is not a sensory difference, but a
cognitive one (Strawson, 1994, 5–6). This is why Strawson then concludes
as follows:
»… the apprehension and understanding of cognitive content, considered just as such and in-
dependently of any accompaniments in any of the sensory-modality-based modes of imagina-
tion or mental representation, is part of experience, part of the flesh or content of experience,
and hence, trivially, part of the qualitative character of experience«. (Strawson, 1994, 12)5
Every conscious state, be it a perception, an emotion, a recollection, an ab-
stract belief etc., has a certain subjective character, a certain phenomenal
quality, a certain quality of ‘what it is like’ to live through or undergo that
state. This is what makes the mental state in question conscious. In fact, the
reason we can be aware of our occurrent mental states (and distinguish
them from one another) is exactly because there is something it is like to
be in those states. The widespread view that only sensory and emotional
states have phenomenal qualities must consequently be rejected. Such a
view is not only simply wrong, phenomenologically speaking. Its attempt to
reduce phenomenality to the »raw feel« of sensation marginalizes and trivi-
alizes phenomenal consciousness, and is detrimental to a correct under-
standing of its cognitive significance.6
2. An Intentionalistic Interpretation
of Phenomenal Qualities
It is one thing to argue that there is a phenomenal side to all conscious
forms of intentionality, but what about the claim that all experiences have
intentional features? Is that really true, or are there not a manifold of ex-
periences which lack intentionality, say, feelings of pains or nausea, or
moods like anxiety or nervousness?
The usual way to handle this problem in phenomenology has been by dis-
tinguishing two very different kinds of intentionality. In a narrow sense, in-
tentionality is defined as object-directedness, in a broader sense, which
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covers what Husserl called operative [fungierende] intentionality, intention-
ality is defined as openness towards alterity and includes for instance our
non-objectifying being-in-the-world. In both cases, the emphasis is on de-
nying the attempt to understand consciousness as some kind of self-en-
closed immanence.
If we go to the alleged non-intentional experiences with this distinction in
mind, then it is true that pervasive moods such as sadness, boredom, nos-
talgia, or anxiety must be distinguished from intentional feelings like the
desire for an apple, or the admiration for a particular person. But although
the moods in question are not types of object-intentionality, although they
all do lack a specific intentional object, they are not without a reference to
the world. They do not enclose us within ourselves, but are lived through as
pervasive affective atmospheres that deeply influence the way we encoun-
ter entities in the world. Just think, for example, of moods like curiosity,
nervousness, or happiness. In fact, it has occasionally even been argued
that moods rather than being merely attendant phenomena are rather fun-
damental forms of disclosure. We are always in some kind of mood. Even a
neutral and distanced observation has its own tone, and as Heidegger fa-
mously wrote,
»Mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible direct-
ing oneself toward something.« (Heidegger, 1996, 129)
What about something like pain then? Well, Sartre’s classical analysis in
L’être et le néant is, I think, illuminating. Assume that you are sitting late at
night trying to finish a book. You have been reading most of the day and
your eyes are hurting. How does this pain originally manifest itself? Accor-
ding to Sartre, not yet as a thematic object of reflection, but by influencing
the way in which you perceive the world. You might become restless, irri-
tated, have difficulties in focusing and concentrating. The words on the
page may tremble or quiver. At this point, the pain is not yet apprehended
as an intentional object, but that does not mean that it is either cognitively
absent or unconscious. It is not yet reflected-upon as a psychic object, but
rather given as a vision-in-pain, as an affective atmosphere that influences
your intentional interaction with the world (Sartre, 1943, 380–381).
The divide and rule strategy, the attempt to separate intentionality and
phenomenality, the attempt to deny that intentional states have any intrin-
sic phenomenal properties, and that phenomenal states have any intrinsic
intentional properties, and the attempt to treat each topic as if it could be
understood in isolation from the other, does not only very easily lead to a
kind of »consciousness inessentialism«, to the view that phenomenal con-
sciousness is cognitively epiphenomenal. As mentioned earlier, the strategy
also seems to reinstate a traditional concept of subjectivity that runs foul of
everything that has been captured by the phrase ‘being-in-the-world’.
According to such a traditional (empiricist) concept, phenomenal conscio-
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As Siewert has argued convincingly, the phe-
nomenality of thinking is not a single phe-
nomenally unvarying or monotonous experi-
ence. It is not as if the ‘what it is like’ to have
conscious thoughts is the same, no matter
what these thoughts are about; rather the phe-
nomenal character of thinking is in continual
modulation (Siewert, 1998, 278–282).
6
For further attempts to argue in defence of a
broader notion of phenomenal consciousness:
cf. Smith, 1989, Flanagan, 1992, Goldman,
1997, Van Gulick, 1997, and Siewert 1998.
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usness has in and of itself no relation to the world. It is like a closed con-
tainer filled with experiences that have no immediate bearing on the world
outside. Typically, this internalist position has then been given a represen-
tationalist slant: On its own, our mind cannot reach all the way to the ob-
jects themselves. It is therefore necessary to introduce some kind of repre-
sentational interface between the mind and the world if we are to under-
stand and explain intentionality, i.e., the claim has been that our cognitive
access to the world is mediated by mental representations.
In contrast, for the phenomenologists, subjectivity – the experiential dimen-
sion – is not a self-enclosed mental realm; rather, subjectivity and world
are, as Merleau-Ponty puts it in his Phénoménologie de la perception, co-de-
pendent and inseparable (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 491–492). Subjectivity is
essentially oriented and open toward that which it is not, and it is exactly in
this openness that it reveals itself to itself. What is disclosed by the cogito
is, consequently, not a self-contained immanence or a pure interior self-
presence, but an openness toward alterity, a movement of exteriorization
and perpetual self-transcendence.7 Since the phenomenological theories of
intentionality are unfailingly non-representationalist, they also reject the
view according to which phenomenal experiences are to be conceived of as
some kind of internal movie screen that confronts us with mental represen-
tations. We are ‘zunächst und zumeist’ directed at real existing objects, and
this directedness is not mediated by any intra-mental objects. The so-called
qualitative character of experience, the taste of a lemon, the smell of coffee,
the coldness of an ice cube are not at all qualities belonging to some spuri-
ous mental objects, but qualities of the presented objects. Rather than say-
ing that we experience representations, it would be better to say that our ex-
periences are presentational, and that they present the world as having cer-
tain features.8
Reflections like these can also be found in analytical philosophy. Recently,
a number of analytical philosophers have criticized the view that phenome-
nal qualities are in and of themselves non-intentional, and have instead de-
fended what might be called an intentionalistic interpretation of phenome-
nal qualities. The point of departure has been the observation that it can
often be quite difficult to distinguish a description of certain objects from a
description of the experience of these very same objects. Back in 1903,
G.E. Moore called attention to this fact, and dubbed it the peculiar diapha-
nous quality of experience: When you try to focus your attention on the in-
trinsic features of experience, you always seem to end up attending to what
the experience is of. And as Tye argues, the lesson of this transparency is
that «phenomenology ain’t in the head« (Tye, 1995, 151). To discover what it
is like, you need to look at what is being intentionally represented.9 Thus,
as the argument goes, experiences do not have intrinsic and non-inten-
tional qualities of their own, rather the qualitative character of experience
consists entirely, as Dretske writes, in the qualitative properties objects are
experienced as having (Dretske, 1995, 1). Or to put it differently, the phe-
nomenal qualities are qualities of that which is represented. Differences in
what it is like are actually intentional differences. Thus an experience of a
red apple is subjectively distinct from an experience of a yellow sunflower
in virtue of the fact that different kinds of objects are represented. Experi-
ences simply acquire their phenomenal character by representing the out-
side world. As a consequence, all phenomenal qualities are as such inten-
tional. There are no non-intentional experiences. Thus, for Tye pain (and I
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assume that he is only talking about physical pain) is nothing but a sensory
representation of bodily damage or disorder (Tye, 1995, 113).
Dretske’s and Tye’s intentionalistic interpretation of phenomenal qualities
has the great advantage of staying clear of any kind of immanentism. As al-
ready mentioned, it also bears a certain resemblance to views found in phe-
nomenology. This is in particular the case for the analysis offered by Sartre.
Sartre is renowned for his very radical interpretation of intentionality. To
affirm the intentionality of consciousness is, according to Sartre, to deny
the existence of any kind of mental content (including any kind of sense-
data or qualia) (Sartre, 1943, 26, 363). There is nothing in consciousness,
neither objects nor mental representations. It is completely empty. Thus,
for Sartre, the being of intentional consciousness consists in its revelation
of transcendent being (Sartre, 1943, 28). Sartre consequently takes the
phenomenal qualities to be qualities of worldly objects, and certainly not to
be located within consciousness. However, from the fact that consciousness
is nothing apart from its revelation of transcendent being (or as Tye and
Dretske would probably say, from the fact that it exhausts itself in its repre-
sentation of external reality), Sartre would never infer that intentional con-
sciousness is therefore no problem for reductionism. On the contrary, in
his view, it is exactly the emptiness (or non-substantiality) of consciousness,
that demonstrates its irreducibility.
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This might sound like externalism. But actu-
ally, it is questionable whether the very
choice between internalism and externalism,
an alternative based on the division between
inner and outer – is reference determined by
factors internal to the mind, or by factors ex-
ternal to the mind? – is at all acceptable to
the phenomenologists. Already in Logical In-
vestigations Husserl argued that the notions
of inner and outer, notions which he claimed
expressed a naïve commonsensical metaphy-
sics, were inappropriate when it came to un-
derstanding the nature of intentionality (cf.
Husserl, 1984, 673, 708). This rejection of a
commonsensical split between mind and world
is even more pronounced after Husserl’s
transcendental turn. In Cartesian Meditati-
ons, for instance, Husserl writes that it is ab-
surd to conceive of consciousness and true
being as if they were merely externally re-
lated, when the truth is that they are essen-
tially interdependent and united (Husserl,
1976, 117. Cf. Husserl, 1959, 432). If we pass
on to Heidegger, he is also famous for hav-
ing argued that the relation between Dasein
and world could not be grasped with the help
of the concepts ‘inner’ and ‘outer’. As he
writes in Being and Time: AIn directing itself
toward… and in grasping something, Da-sein
does not first go outside of the inner sphere
in which it is initially encapsulated, but, ra-
ther, in its primary kind of being, it is always
already ‘outside’ together with some being
encountered in the world already discover-
ed. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when
Da-sein dwells together with a being to be
known and determines its character. Rather,
even in this ‘being outside’ together with its
object, Da-sein is ‘inside’ correctly under-
stood; that is, it itself exists as the being-in-
the-world which knows« (Heidegger, 1996,
58). In my view, the phenomenological ana-
lyses of intentionality (be it Husserl’s, Hei-
degger’s, or Merleau-Ponty’s) all entail such
a fundamental rethinking of the very rela-
tion between subjectivity and environment
that it no longer makes sense to designate
them as being either internalist or external-
ist. This claim might be relatively uncontro-
versial when it comes to Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty, but it is controversial when
it comes to Husserl, since he (at least by An-
glo-American philosophers) is frequently in-
terpreted as a prototypical internalist and
methodological solipsist. However, I believe
that this interpretation is based on some-
thing that approaches a complete misunder-
standing of what Husserl is up to (including
a misinterpretation of his concept of noema,
and of his notion of phenomenological reduc-
tion), but it would lead too far to argue for
this claim here. See however Zahavi, 2003b.
8
This also happens to be Putnam’s view (cf.
Putnam 1999, 156). For a discussion of some
of the many affinities between Putnam’s re-
cent reflections and views found in pheno-
menology, cf. Zahavi, 2004.
9
In contrast to the phenomenologists, how-
ever, both Tye and Dretske are representa-
tionalists; they have no qualms speaking of
experiences as representing the outside world.
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Both Tye and Dretske explicitly criticize the attempt to draw a sharp dis-
tinction between the intentional or (re)presentational aspects of our men-
tal lives and their phenomenal or subjective or felt aspects. But interest-
ingly enough, their reason for attacking the separation is exactly the oppo-
site of my own. By proposing an intentionalistic interpretation of phe-
nomenality they hope to avoid the hard problem altogether. Why? Because
if phenomenality is basically a question of intentionality, and if intentiona-
lity can be explained reductively in terms of functional or causal relations,
one can accept the existence of phenomenality (neither Dretske nor Tye
are eliminativists) and still remain a physicalist (Tye, 1995, 153, 181).
I think this conclusion is wrong. The decisive difficulty for reductionism is
not the existence of epiphenomenal qualia, qualia in the sense of atomic,
irrelational, ineffable, incomparable, and incorrigible mental objects. And
the hard problem does not disappear if one (rightfully) denies the exis-
tence of such entities, and if one, so to speak, relocates the phenomenal
from the ‘inside’ to the ‘outside’. The hard problem is not about the exis-
tence of non-physical objects of experience, but about the very existence of
subjective experience itself, it is about the very fact that objects are given to
us (cf. Rudd, 1998).
When asked to exemplify the ‘what it is like’ quality of experience, one will
often find references to what has traditionally been called secondary sense
qualities, such as the smell of coffee, the color of red silk, or the taste of a
lemon. However, this answer reveals an ambiguity in the notion of ‘what it
is like’. Normally, the ‘what it is like’ aspect is taken to designate experien-
tial properties. However, if our experiences are to have qualities of their
own, they must be qualities over and above whatever qualities the inten-
tional object has. But it is exactly the silk which is red, and not my percep-
tion of it. Likewise, it is the lemon that is bitter and not my experience of it.
The taste of the lemon is a qualitative feature of the lemon, and must be
distinguished from whatever qualities my tasting of the lemon has. Even if
there is no other way to gain access to the gustatory quality of the lemon
than by tasting it, this will not turn the quality of the object into a quality of
the experience. But in this case a certain problem arises. There is definitely
something it is like to taste coffee, just as there is an experiential difference
between tasting wine and water. However, when one asks for this quality
and for this qualitative difference, it seems hard to point to anything beside
the taste of coffee, wine, and water, though this is not what we are looking
for. Should we consequently conclude that there is in fact nothing in the
tasting of the lemon apart from the taste of the lemon itself?
However, this conclusion is overhasty, and it overlooks that there are two
sides to the question of ‘what it is like’. In Ideas I, Husserl distinguishes be-
tween the intentional object in ‘the how of its determinations’ (im Wie sei-
ner Bestimmtheiten) and in ‘the how of its givenness’ (im Wie seiner Gege-
benheitsweisen) (Husserl, 1973, 303–304). Although this distinction is intro-
duced as a distinction that falls within the noematic domain (rather than
being a distinction between the noetic and the noematic domain), it never-
theless points us in the right direction: There is a difference between asking
about the property the object is experienced as having (what does the ob-
ject feel like to the perceiver) and asking about the property of the experi-
ence of the object (what does the perceiving feel like to the perceiver).
Both questions pertain to the phenomenal dimension, but whereas the first
question concerns a worldly property, the second concerns an experiential
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property.10 Contrary to what both Dretske and Tye are claiming, we conse-
quently need to distinguish between: 1) what the object is like for the sub-
ject and 2) what the experience of the object is like for the subject (cf. Car-
ruthers, 1998, McIntyre, 1999).11 However, insisting upon this distinction is
not enough. The tricky part is to respect the lesson of transparency and to
avoid misconstruing the experiential properties as if they belong to some
kind of mental objects. It is not the case that worldly properties such as
blue or sweet are matched one by one by experiential doublets of an ineffa-
ble nature (let us call them *blue or *sweet) and that both kind of proper-
ties are present in ordinary perception. So again, how then is the distinc-
tion to be cashed in phenomenologically?
We are never conscious of an object simpliciter, but always of the object as
appearing in a certain way (as judged, seen, described, feared, remem-
bered, smelled, anticipated, tasted, etc.). We cannot be conscious of an ob-
ject (a tasted lemon, a smelt rose, a seen table, a touched piece of silk)
unless we are aware of the experience through which this object is made to
appear (the tasting, smelling, seeing, touching). But this is not to say that
our access to, say, the lemon is indirect, namely mediated, contaminated, or
blocked by our awareness of the experience, since the given experience is
not itself an object on a par with the lemon, but instead constitutes the very
access to the lemon. The object is given through the experience, and if
there is no awareness of the experience, the object does not appear at all.
If we lose consciousness, we (or more precisely our bodies) will remain
causally connected to a number of different objects, but none of these ob-
jects will appear. In short, my experience of a red cherry or a bitter lemon
is the way in which these objects are there for me. The red cherry is present
for me, through my seeing it. I attend to the objects through the experi-
ences. Experiences are not objects; rather they are accesses to objects.
These accesses can take different forms; one and the same object (with the
exact same worldly properties) can be given in a number of different mo-
des of givenness, it can for instance be given as perceived, imagined, or re-
collected. Experiential properties are not properties like red or bitter; rather
they are properties pertaining to these different types of access.
Although the different modes of givenness differ from one another, they
also share certain features. One common feature is the quality of mineness,
the fact that the experiences are characterized by a first-personal given-
ness. When I am aware of an occurrent pain, perception, or thought from
the first-person perspective, the experience in question is given immedia-
tely, non-inferentially and non-criterially as mine.12
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10
To speak of worldly properties in this con-
text should not be misunderstood. It does not
entail any metaphysical claims concerning the
subject-independent existence of the said pro-
perties. The claim being made is merely that
the properties in question are properties of
the experienced objects, and not of the expe-
rience of the objects.
11
Carruthers further argues that Dretske’s and
Tye’s first-order representational theories of
consciousness are incapable of accounting
for the difference between these two aspects,
and that a kind of higher-order representa-
tional theory is called for (Carruthers, 1998,
209). I disagree with this view, but it would
lead too far to present my criticism here. Cf.
Zahavi, 1999.
12
It could be objected that it is misleading to
suggest that experiences can be given in
more than one way. Either an experience is
given from a first-person perspective, or it is
not given at all. But I think this is mistake. It
is correct, that experiences must always be
given from a first-person perspective, other-
wise they wouldn’t be experiences, but this
doesn’t prevent them from being given from
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Whereas the object of John’s perception, along with all its properties, is in-
tersubjectively accessible in the sense that it can in principle be given to
others in the same way that it is given to John, John’s perceptual experi-
ence itself is only given directly to John. Whereas John and Mary can both
perceive the numerically identical same red cherry, each of them have their
own distinct perception of it, and can share these just as little as Mary can
share John’s bodily pain. Mary might certainly realize that John is in pain,
she might even sympathize with John, but she cannot actually feel John’s
pain the same way John does. Mary has no access to the first-personal given-
ness of John’s experience.
This first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena is not something
quite incidental to their being, a mere varnish that the experiences could
lack without ceasing to be experiences. On the contrary, it is this first-
personal givenness that makes the experiences subjective. To put it diffe-
rently, with a slightly risky phrasing, their first-personal givenness entails a
built-in self-reference, a primitive experiential self-referentiality.13
In contrast to the redness of the tomato or the bitterness of the tea (both
of which are worldly properties) the mineness characterizing the percep-
tion of the redness or bitterness is not a worldly property, but an experien-
tial property. When asked to specify ‘what the experience of the object is
like for the subject’, this is exactly one of the features to mention. In short,
the experiential dimension does not have to do with the existence of ineffa-
ble qualia, it has to do with this dimension of first-personal experiencing.
The ‘what it is like’ question has two sides to it: ‘what is the object like for
the subject’ and ‘what is the experience of the object like for the subject’.
But although these two sides can be conceptually and phenomenologically
distinguished, distinguishability is not the same as separability. It is not as if
the two sides or aspects of phenomenal experience can be detached and
encountered in separation from each other. When I touch the cold surface
of a refrigerator is the sensation of coldness that I then feel a property of
the experienced object, or rather a property of the experience of the ob-
ject? The correct answer is that the sensory experience contains two diffe-
rent dimensions to it, namely a distinction between the sensing and the
sensed, and that we can focus upon either. Phenomenology pays attention
to the givenness of the object. But it does not simply focus on the object ex-
actly as it is given, it also focuses on the subjective side of consciousness,
thereby becoming aware of our subjective accomplishments and the inten-
tionality that is at play in order for the object to appear as it does. When
we investigate appearing objects, we also disclose ourselves as datives of
manifestation, as those to whom objects appear.
To put it differently, when speaking of a first-person perspective, when
speaking of a dimension of first-personal experiencing, it would be a mis-
take to argue that this is something that exclusively concerns the type of ac-
cess that a given subject has to its own experiences, whereas the access to
objects in the common world is independent of a first-person perspective,
precisely in that it involves a third-person perspective. This line of thought
will not do, and for the following reason: Obviously, I can be directed at in-
tersubjectively accessible objects, but although my access to these objects is
of the very same kind as the access of other persons, this does not imply
that there is no first-person perspective involved. Rather, intersubjectively
accessible objects are intersubjectively accessible precisely in so far as they
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can in principle be accessed directly from each and every first-person per-
spective. They thereby differ from experiences, which are in principle only
directly accessible from the very same first-person perspective that they
themselves constitute. Phrased differently, every givenness, be it the given-
ness of mental states, or the givenness of physical objects, involves a first-
person perspective. There is no pure third-person perspective, just as there
is no view from nowhere. To believe in the existence of such a pure third-
person perspective is to succumb to an objectivist illusion. Of course, this is
not to say that there is no third-person perspective, but merely that such a
perspective is exactly a perspective from somewhere. It is a view that we can
adopt on the world. It is a perspective that is founded upon a first-person
perspective, or to be more exact it emerges out of the encounter between at
least two first-person perspectives, that is, it involves intersubjectivity.14
To summarize: The phenomenal dimension covers both domains: 1) what
the object is like for the subject, and 2) what the experience of the object is
like for the subject. The moment we are dealing with manifestation or ap-
pearance we are faced with the phenomenal dimension. In fact, the ‘what it
is like’ is exactly a question of how something appears to me, that is, it is a
question of how it is given to and experienced by me. When I imagine a
unicorn, desire an ice-cream, anticipate a holiday, or reflect upon an eco-
nomic crisis, all of these experiences bring me into the presence of diffe-
rent intentional objects. What this means is not only that I am phenome-
nally acquainted with a series of worldly properties such as blue, sweet, or
heavy, it also involve that the object is there for me in different modes of
givenness (as imagined, perceived, recollected, anticipated etc). Both the
worldly properties of the appearing object and the experiential properties
of the modes of givenness are part of the phenomenal dimension. They are
not to be separated, but neither are they to be confused.
In short, the wrong conclusion to draw from an intentionalistic interpreta-
tion of phenomenal qualities is that there is no hard problem of conscious-
ness but only the easy problem of intentionality (information processing).
The right conclusion to draw is that intentionality has a first-person aspect
to it that makes it part of the hard problem, and that it resists reductive ex-
planation just as much as phenomenality does.
3. The Janus-Face of Experience
Even if it is true that intentionality and phenomenality are related, the na-
ture of this relation still remains open for discussion. Is it intrinsic or ex-
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a second-person perspective as well. Let us
assume that I crash, and that I am being
scolded by the driver whose car I have just
damaged. That the driver is angry is not
something I infer on the basis of an argu-
ment from analogy, it is something I imme-
diately experience (cf. Scheler, 1973, 254,
Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 52–53). That I experi-
ence the anger of the other, doesn’t imply
that my experience is infallible (perhaps the
driver is actually happy about the accident,
since he can now finally get a new car, but he
simply doesn’t want to show his real feel-
ings), nor that the anger of the other is given
to me in the same way that it is given to the
driver himself. The anger is exactly given
from a second-person perspective to me. If
one denies that experiences can be given in
this way, if one, in other words, categorically
denies that we can experience other’s experi-
ences, one is confronted with the threat of
solipsism (cf. Zahavi, 2001a).
13
For an extensive argumentation, cf. Zahavi
1999, 2003a.
14
For a more elaborate argument, cf. Zahavi,
2001b.
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trinsic? Is it essential or merely contingent? To claim that it is contingent,
that is, to claim that intentionality is indifferent to whether it takes place in
a conscious or unconscious medium is to subscribe to something McGinn
has called the Medium Conception. According to this view, the relation be-
tween consciousness and intentionality is like the relation between a me-
dium of representation and the message it conveys. On one side, we have
the medium of sound, shape, or experience, and on the other, the content
of meaning and reference. Each side can be investigated in separation
from the other since their relation is completely contingent. Thus, accord-
ing to this view, consciousness is nothing but a (rather mysterious) medium
in which something relatively mundane, namely intentionality, is contin-
gently embedded (McGinn, 1991, 35). But is this really convincing?
On the face of it, what the experience is like and what it is of are by no
means independent properties. Phenomenologists have typically argued that
every appearance is an appearance of something for someone. Every appe-
arance always has its genitive and dative. More recently, McGinn has made
the same point, and has argued that experiences are Janus-faced: They
have a world-directed aspect, they present the world in a certain way, but
at the same time they also involve presence to the subject, and hence a sub-
jective point of view. In short, they are of something other than the subject
and they are like something for the subject, and as McGinn then continues:
»But these two faces do not wear different expressions: for what the experience is like is a
function of what it is of, and what it is of is a function of what it is like. Told that an experi-
ence is as of a scarlet sphere you know what it is like to have it; and if you know what it is like
to have it, then you know how it represents things. The two faces are, as it were, locked to-
gether. The subjective and the semantic are chained to each other.« (McGinn, 1991, 29–30)
In other words, the intentional and semantic content of an experience
stands in an intimate relation to its phenomenal character and vice versa.
But if what we are aware of is inextricably bound up with how it appears to
us, phenomenal consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but rather cognitively
indispensable.
Of course, it is possible to find a variety of different views on the matter.
Some would say that intentionality is only a feature of conscious states, i.e.,
that only consciousness is in possession of genuine intentionality, and that
any other ascription of intentionality is either derived or metaphorical
(Searle, 1998, 92–93). One line of argumentation in favor of such a view
would be a line stressing the intrinsic connection between experience,
meaning, and intentionality. As Strawson puts it:
»[M]eaning is always a matter of something meaning something to something. In this sense,
nothing means anything in an experienceless world. There is no possible meaning, hence no
possible intention, hence no possible intentionality, on an experienceless planet […]. There is
no entity that means anything in this universe. There is no entity that is about anything. There
is no semantic evaluability, no truth, no falsity. None of these properties are possessed by any-
thing until experience begins. There is a clear and fundamental sense in which meaning, and
hence intentionality, exists only in the conscious moment […].« (Strawson, 1994, 208–209)
Strawson consequently claims that experience is a necessary condition for
genuine aboutness, and he suggests that there is an analogy between the
sense in which a sleeping person might be said to be in possession of be-
liefs, preferences, etc. and the sense in which a CD might be said to con-
tain music when it is not being played by a CD player. Considered merely
as physical systems neither of them are intrinsically about one thing rather
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than another, neither of them have any intrinsic (musical or mental) con-
tent. Strictly speaking,
»… it is no more true to say that there are states of the brain, or of Louis, that have intrinsic
mental content, when Louis is in a dreamless and experienceless sleep, than it is true to say
that there are states of a CD that have intrinsic musical content as it sits in its box«. (Straw-
son, 1994, 167)
However, apart from outright denying the existence of genuine non-con-
scious intentionality, there is also another option open. One might accept
the existence of a non-conscious form of intentionality, but still argue that
non-conscious intentionality and conscious intentionality has nothing (or
very little) in common, for which reason an elucidation of the first type of
intentionality throws no light upon the kind of intentionality that we find in
conscious life. It is not possible to account for the intentionality of my ex-
perience without accounting for the phenomenal aspect of the experience
as well, and it is impossible to account for the phenomenal aspect of the
experience without referring to its intentionality. Any discussion of inten-
tional consciousness that left out the question of phenomenal conscious-
ness (and vice versa) would be severely deficient. In short, when it comes to
conscious intentionality we need an integrated approach. For this reason,
Chalmers’s distinction between the hard and the easy problems of conscio-
usness is problematic. What he calls the easy problems of consciousness are
either part of the hard problem or not about consciousness at all.
4. Conclusion
This article has had three aims: To problematize Chalmers’s distinction be-
tween the hard and easy problems of consciousness; to offer some reflec-
tions on the relationship between intentionality and experience; and finally
to point to some of the convergences between contemporary analytical phi-
losophy of mind and phenomenology.
As for the first aim, I don’t think anything needs to be added. As for the
second, all that I have been able to offer have been some preliminary re-
flections, and there are course many additional problems that have been
left untouched. To mention a few: There is the question about the exis-
tence of the unconscious, and about so-called dispositional beliefs. How do
they fit into the framework presented above?15 There is also the entire dis-
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15
Does it make sense to speak of an uncon-
scious tasting of coffee? An unconscious
hearing and appreciation of Miles Davis? An
unconscious desiring for chocolate? If an un-
conscious experience is to deserve its name,
and not merely be an objective, physical pro-
cess, it must presumably be subjective. After
all, we do not call a stone, a table or the
blood in our veins unconscious. But where is
this subjectivity to manifest itself? Supposed-
ly in the particular first-personal givenness
of the experience. But it is difficult to imag-
ine how an unconscious experience should
possess such a feature. Unconscious experi-
ences are per definition without a first-per-
sonal givenness; there is nothing it is like for
the subject to have them. But can one really
abstract the peculiar subjective givenness of
the experience from the experience and still
retain an experience, or is the ontology of
experiencing not rather a first-person onto-
logy? If it is a defining feature of an experi-
ence that there is necessarily something it is
like for the subject to have it, it will be just
as non-sensical to speak of an unconscious
experience as to speak of an unconscious
consciousness (something that even Freud
refrained from doing, cf. Freud, 1945, 434).
Of course, this does not exclude that there
might be different non-conscious states and
processes that play a causal role in our expe-
rience, but to speak of such non-conscious
processes is not per se to speak of unconscious
experiences. Flanagan has recently introduced
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cussion between internalism and externalism. Externalists typically claim
that differences in thought can be extraphenomenally fixed. If this is true,
what implications does it have for the relation between intentionality and
experience? Then there is the question of how an intentionalistic interpre-
tation of phenomenal qualities can handle cases of hallucinations. And fi-
nally, what about the objection that the attempt to argue for an intimate
relation between intentionality and experience imply some subtle form of
psychologism? To claim that there is a special experience of understanding
is bound to provoke the Wittgensteinians. But how should one defuse their
criticism? All of these questions are topics in need of further treatment.
Let me spend some more time on the third issue, however. In recent years
the issues of subjectivity, phenomenal consciousness, and selfhood have
once again become central and respectable topics in analytical philosophy.
This change in orientation has in general made analytical philosophers
much more receptive to phenomenology. In fact, it is now almost common-
place to argue that any convincing theory of mind has to take phenomeno-
logy into account. However, this ready use of the term ‘phenomenology’ is
to some extent rather misleading. When speaking of phenomenology the
vast majority of analytical philosophers are simply referring to a first-per-
son description of what the ‘what it is like’ of experience is really like. Phe-
nomenology is in other words identified with some kind of introspecti-
onism. But for anybody familiar with Continental philosophy, this notion of
phenomenology will appear as both tame and lame. Given the recent de-
velopments in analytical philosophy of mind, it would make much more
sense to engage in a discussion with the kind of phenomenology that was
inaugurated by Husserl, and developed and transformed by, among many
others, Scheler, Heidegger, Fink, Gurwitsch, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lévi-
nas, and Henry. The fact that subjectivity has always been of central con-
cern to phenomenologists, and that they have devoted much time to a close
scrutiny of the first-person perspective, the structures of experience, time-
consciousness, body-awareness, self-awareness, intentionality, and so forth,
makes them into obvious interlocutors.16
In my discussion of the relationship between intentionality and experience
I have tried to show that contemporary analytical philosophy of mind and
(Continental) phenomenology have a number of common concerns.17 Ho-
wever, in the beginning of the article I briefly mentioned that a more open
exchange between the two traditions might not only help prevent further
unintended repetitions, but that it might also bring the contemporary de-
bate to a higher level of sophistication. I am not sure that I have already
succeeded in demonstrating the later claim. This is in part because I chose
to focus on a number of existing similarities and overlaps. This choice was
propaedeutically motivated: If an exchange is to be encouraged, it is first
necessary to show that the much discussed gap between analytical philoso-
phy and continental philosophy, a gap which has often been taken to be so
wide that it prevents any kind of dialogue, is a fiction. However, although
the mere existence of overlaps might be fascinating, if the discussion is to
move forward it is not the overlaps that are of real interest, it is the (rele-
vant) differences. In other words, the reason why analytical philosophers
should pay more attention to phenomenology is not because the latter tra-
dition contains analyses that are fully up to date with what is currently go-
ing on in analytical philosophy of mind. No, the real reason is of course
that phenomenology is still way ahead of analytical philosophy when it
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comes to the investigation of certain aspects of consciousness. In contrast
to many analytical philosophers, the phenomenologists have never taken
the problem of consciousness to be first and foremost a question of how to
relate consciousness to the brain, first and foremost a question of how to
reduce consciousness to mind- and meaningless matter. Not only have they
considered this enterprise to be futile for various conceptual reasons, but
they have also typically argued that such a take completely overlooks the
urgent need for a thorough investigation of phenomenal consciousness on
its own terms. To put it differently, although the phenomenologists have
typically conceived of the experiential dimension as being so fundamental
that no non-circular explanation of it is possible, they would deny that such
an outlook puts a hold on further analysis. After all, there is much more to
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and ‘informational sensitivity’. Somebody may
be experientially insensitive but informatio-
nally sensitive to a certain difference. When
we are merely informationally sensitive to
something, we are not conscious of it, that is,
pure informational sensitivity, or to use a
better expression, pure informational pickup
and processing is non-conscious. It is a pro-
cessing without phenomenal awareness (Fla-
nagan, 1992, 55–56, 147). Subjectivity has to
do with experiential sensitivity, and it is only
the latter that lets us have phenomenal ac-
cess to the object. But although it might be
appropriate to operate with a notion of
non-conscious informational processing, I
think one should be careful not to assume
that the informational sensitivity provides us
with a non-phenomenal version of the exact
same information as the experiential sensiti-
vity. To suggest something like that is once
again to flirt with the view that conscious-
ness is cognitively epiphenomenal.
16
Back in 1995, in a book entitled Approaches
to Intentionality, William Lyons gave a de-
tailed overview of a number of contempo-
rary theories of intentionality. He distingui-
shed between an ‘instrumentalist approach’
(Dennett), a ‘representationalist approach’
(Fodor), a ‘teleological approach’ (Millikan),
an ‘information-processing approach’ (Dret-
ske), and a ‘functionalist approach’ (Loar).
In the introduction prefacing his discussion
of these different approaches, Lyons briefly
remarked that contemporary theories deny
the claim of Brentano and Husserl: That
consciousness is essential to intentionality
(Lyons, 1995, 4). This appraisal provokes
three critical questions: The first is whether
Lyons account is already outdated. As part
of the general ‘consciousness boom’, the re-
lation between consciousness and intentio-
nality is currently once again up for discus-
sion. The second is whether Lyons account
was already outdated when he wrote it: Not
only does it seem rather strange that Lyons
ignored Searle’s theory of intentionality, but
even more to the point – Lyons apparently
thought that theories of intentionality were
an exclusive concern of analytical philosophy.
Thus, he made no reference whatsoever to
the theories of intentionality found in twen-
tieth century German and French thought.
A final critical comment concerns Lyons’s
repeated tendency to place Brentano and
Husserl side by side. Lyons is not alone in
making them two of a kind (though it is ra-
ther strange to see Husserl’s theory of inten-
tionality described as nineteenth century
theory [Lyons, 1995, 3]), but that Lyons’s
view is shared by many other analytical phi-
losophers does not make it any more true.
Not only are there absolutely crucial diffe-
rences between Brentano’s and Husserl’s
theory of intentionality (this is the case even
for Husserl’s early theory in Logical Investi-
gations), but to have Brentano’s theory of in-
tentionality presented again and again as the
sole Continental alternative to the appro-
aches found in analytical philosophy, as is
frequently being done by analytical philoso-
phers, reveals an astonishing lack of familia-
rity with the philosophical tradition.
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Another area is the issue of self-awareness.
The phenomenological investigation of self-
awareness has typically been set in the con-
text of a discussion of such diverse issues as
spatiality, embodiment, temporality, intersu-
bjectivity, attention, and so forth. However,
it is also a characteristic feature of recent
analytical philosophy that an increasing num-
ber of philosophers have distanced themsel-
ves from traditional armchair philosophy
and abandoned the attempt to capture the
basic structures of mind solely by means of a
priori conceptual analysis. Instead, they have
started to engage in dialogue with empirical
science, and to draw upon the resources
found in cognitive science, psychopathology,
neuropsychology, and developmental psycho-
logy. As a result, they have become aware of
the interplay between subjectivity, embodi-
ment, and environment, and have reached
conclusions on issues such as the existence
of prelinguistic forms of self-awareness, the
bodily roots of self-experience, and the con-
nection between exteroception and proprio-
ception, that all bear a striking resemblance
to views already found in phenomenology.
Cf. Zahavi, 1999 and 2002.
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the question of phenomenal consciousness than a mere recognition of its
irreducibility. A thorough elucidation of its structures requires a closer in-
vestigation of such issues as selfhood, first-personal givenness, attention,
thematic and marginal consciousness, reflective and pre-reflective self-con-
sciousness, inner time-consciousness, body-awareness, etc.
Given the richness of the phenomenological analyses of consciousness, and
given that many of the conclusions that have lately been reached by analyti-
cal philosophers are in fact rediscoveries; the habitual stance of analytical
philosophy towards phenomenology – which has ranged from complete dis-
regard to outright hostility – can only be characterized as counterproduc-
tive. But just as phenomenology has something to offer analytical philoso-
phy, phenomenology can certainly also profit, not only from the analytical
discussions of, for instance, indexicality, the first-person perspective, inter-
nalism vs. externalism, and the possibility of pre-linguistic experience, but
also from the conceptual clarity and problem-oriented approach found in
analytical philosophy. Thus, the very attempt to engage in dialogue with
analytical philosophy might hopefully force phenomenology to become
more problem-oriented and thereby counteract what is currently one of its
greatest weaknesses: its preoccupation with exegesis. One concrete step
would be for those trained in phenomenology to make more of an attempt
to formulate their reflections in a relatively non-technical manner. Much
could be achieved by such a gesture. It would be bound to facilitate con-
structive discussions with those figures in analytical philosophy that more
or less on their own have started to work on phenomenological themes.
And it would be a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently
at hand.18
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Dan Zahavi
Intentionalität und Erfahrung
Seit der Veröffentlichung von Chalmers einflussreichem Werk The Conscious Mind (1996) war es
üblich, die philosophischen Probleme des Bewusstseins in zwei Gruppen zu teilen. Während sich
das sogenannte »schwere Problem des Bewusstseins« auf die Natur des phänomenalen Bewusstseins
und die Perspektive der ersten Person bezieht, befasst sich das »leichte Problem des Bewusstseins«
vor allem mit dem Begriff der Intentionalität. Doch es stellt sich die Frage, ob es tatsächlich
möglich ist, Intentionalität eingehend zu erforschen, ohne dabei die erfahrungsbezogenen Dimen-
sionen zu berücksichtigen? Und vice versa, ist es möglich, die Natur der Subjektivität und der Er-
fahrung zu verstehen, wenn man die Intentionalität ignoriert, ohne sich dem Risiko auszusetzen,
den cartesianischen Dualismus von »Subjekt« und »Welt« wieder ins Leben zu rufen, das alles ig-
noriert, was mit dem »In-der-Welt-sein«-Syntagma umschrieben ist? In meinem Artikel untersuche
ich, ob das phänomenale Bewusstsein und die Intentionalität nicht zwei Seiten einer und derselben




Depui la parution, en 1996, de l’ouvrage influent de Chalmer The Conscious Mind, on divise
habituellement les problèmes philosophiques de la conscience en deux groupes. Tandis que les
problèmes dits »ardus« concernent la nature de la conscience phénoménale et la perspective de la
première personne, les problèmes »faciles« concernent principalement la notion d’intentionnalité.
Or, est-il vraiment possible d’étudier l’intentionnalité à fond sans prendre en considération la di-
mension expériencielle? Et vice versa, est-il possible de comprendre la nature de la subjectivité et
de l’expérience sans tenir compte de l’intentionnalité, ou bien ne court-on pas le risque de recon-
stituer ainsi un dualisme cartésien sujet-monde, qui ignore tout ce qu’implique le syntagme »être-
dans-le-monde«? Dans mon article, je me pencherai sur la question de savoir si la conscience phé-
nomenale et l’intentionnalité constituent en fait deux faces d’une même médaille, que l’on ne peut
séparer sans commettre une erreur de division.
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